University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and
Interviews

Mike Mansfield Papers

2-25-1954

The Bricker Amendment: The George Sub.: Executive Agreements
Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Mansfield, Mike 1903-2001, "The Bricker Amendment: The George Sub.: Executive Agreements" (1954).
Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and Interviews. 87.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches/87

This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the Mike Mansfield Papers at ScholarWorks at University
of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and Interviews by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

FOR

RElEASE ON DELIVERY OF SPEECH

SENATOR MANSFJELD (D. 110NTANA)

THE BRICKER AHENDMENT: THE GEOO.GE SUBSTITUTE : EXECUTIVE ACREEMENTS
YiT . President :

I have not participated extensively in the debate on the Bricker
Amendment since much of the debate has been of a legal nature.

In these

matters I yield to those who are much more erudite in constitutional theory
and precedent than Io
Sitting on the sidelines,

ho~ever ,

I cannot help but feel that we

are talking round and round the real issue becuvse we are talking about too
many issues .

Thanks to the many learned expositions which have been made

on the floor of the Senate these past few weeks, I have come to the conclusion
that we are discussing not one question but four questions.

All of these, to

be sure, revolve around a fundamental issue: the division of power among the

several brc..nches of goverament in respect to our :relations with other nations .
But each question has its own ramifications and needs to be considered
separately if the fundamental issue is to be clearly understood.

So long

as they are lumped together, the confusion can only deepen.
The Bricker Amendment, in its original form, as I understand it,
would bring about a drastic and four- sided reshuffling in the ratio of
power among the several branches of government.

In effect, it would shift

power over foreign relations away from the Senate and the Executive .
the same time it would enhance the

po~er

At

of the House of Representatives

and the 48 individual stcte governments in matters effecting our foreign
relations .
The first of the fou= questions that we are really discussing ,
then, is whether to reduce the power of the Senate in the field of

2
foreig~

relations relative to the other

branche~

of government .

Is

there a mer::ber of this body who believes that the Senate has been so
inco~petent

in the performance of its

constitutio~al

duties that it

ought to be relieved of these responsibilities , even in part?

I

speak now of the Senate through 160 years of history , not any
part~cular

Senate.

Has its record been so shaceful, so inadequate thet

the Senate of the 83rd Congress ought to go on record as bdnging
about a fundamental change in its role in A•rJn ' can government?

I,

for one , do not believe that this is so and J doubt thnt any other
member of the Senate so believes.
The second of the four questions before us is whether or
not to increaze the power of the House of Representatives in the
field of foreign relations .

I have heard no demands from the House

for such an increaseo This proposed amendment orig:inated in the
Senate, not in the House.

With all due respect for the great

capacities of the other body in which I was privileged to sit for a
decade , I "'ould not for ce this added responsibility on it.

The

House already has unique r esponsibilities in the field of appropriations.

They are necessary; they are just as valid as the Senate's

unique rol e in foreign relations.

And I would change neither .

The third question which we are discussing is whether or not
to project revolutionary responsibilities in the field of foreign
relations on the 48 state governments .

Except for those who would

turn the clock back, not half e century, not even a century, but 160
years or more , this question hardly merits debate .

The state governments

- 3themselves rejected a role in foreign relations when the Constitution
was accepted.

They provided instead for Senators to protect the

interests of the states in the Senate.

Both the Senior Senator and

the Junior Senator from Montana were elected to safeguard the interests
of Montana within the broad framework of the national interest.

Those

interests include any that may be at stake in our foreign relations .
We will do our best to protect them.

1 am sure that other Senators

will do the same for their states and that

t:!~

r are fully qualified to

do so.
If it is neither a desire to reduce the prywer of the Senate

nor to increase the power of the House or the state governments , what
then is really at issue in this debate'?

There mnst certainly be a

real issue or the Senate would hardly spend weeks in debate of this
proposed amendment.
There is a real issue and it has troubled me deeply as I am
sure it has troubled other Senators.

It is to be found in the fourth

of the questions which are under discussion here: the power of the
Executive Branch in the field of foreign policy.
The Constitution specifically provides the President wl th
certain unique powers to conduct our foreign relations , just as the
other branches of government have unique powers in other matterso

I

do not question those powers which accrue to him as Commander-in-Chief
of the armed forces .
But in one aspect of our foreign relations , the treaty-making
power , he does not have unique, but rather concurrent , power shared with

- /.-

the Senate .

Treaties are to be made by the President only with tle

.,dvice ond consent of the Seuo te .

Tho most vi tal mat ters invoh•in{;

the relationships of this country with others are or should te
conc~rent po~er.

conducted within this realm of

But it is prec..:.sely in this real.'ll that an extra- co:lstitutional device , the executive

a~reement ,
\.J1•1 ,::~·

of power which has been m:tintained

now threatens the f ne lalance
our system of rovein."1cnt for

a cent\TY .!I1d a l alf .
It will be argued ,

1S

it

~as

been , that executive

aerec~ents

are used almost cxch..sively in pt..rst.ance of authority delec;o.ted by
Congress or to " .1plement cert::lin valid underta!<ings

gro~;ing

unique powers of the President.

t~1in 1 ':

Thot is true and I

out of the

the device ,

so used , is necessary and useful and har.nles., to the principle of
balance of powers.
But it is not in the nass
issue is to be

fo~d.

o~

executive agreements that the

It is , r ather , in the few, in the very few .

For it. is in the few , the very few , that this extra- cor.stitutional
device can be t.Sed to stretch the unique po\vers of the Fxecutive .
is in the feu that there lies the danger of

usur'1a~; 0.1 ,

It

des true· ion

of the constitutional balance , anc. in the last analysis , ... he threat
of executive tyranny.
This is no imaginary fenr uhi.ch hann ts me and other nembers
of the Senate .

Executive

~(;reements

have been used to stretch the

powers of the Presidency and unless safeGuards are
is no

rea~on

e~tahlinhed

to believe that they will not continue to te

If the Senate '-.rill be·1r witl me for

'l

~o

tLere

used .

few moments longer , 1 •1::.11

undertake to prove by specific example hoH this eytra-constitutional

- 5device can u."lder:n:ine the

po~.fer

of the Senate in foreign relations .

I will

endeavor to show row this device can and l:as been used to erode tLat pol-ler
and transfer it painlessly, almost imperceptibly, from this body to the
Executive Branch .
For decades , t reaties of friendchip , commerce and

navie;~tion 1.ave

been mace Hith other countries by the President \>Tith the advice and
consent of the Senate .

As the Senators knol.r , these are basic treaties

which establish the frame'I-Iork of our relatb.•f• \!i th other countries.
The Senate has traditionally given advice

~"ld c~nsent

to such treaties .

It still does so , for the most part.
In 1933, however , the Department of State negotiated an arreement
of friendship and commerce \·lith Saudi- Arabia .

lis far as I can determine ,

this was the first time an executive agreement , rather than a tre1.ty ,
was used for this purpose .

To be sure , the aproement \>lith Saudi- Arabia

was labelled provisional in nature and was to remain in effect, I quote:
"until the entry in force of a definitive treaty of co::unerce and navigation. "

Even thoue;h it \.ras temporary, ho\-Tever , the State Department

must have knotm that this executive agreement was treading on dangerous
cons t:i tutional ground for it added the followinz clause , I qt·.ote:
"Should the government of the United States of America be prevented by
future action of its legislature from carryinG out the terms of these
stipulations the oblibations thereof shall thereupon lapse ."
This executive asreement uas nc7rr replaced by a definitive treaty
of friendship , commerce and navir;at:l.on.

Thour;h the Senate has never

given consent to ratification, it stands in equal force \>lith e;enuine
treaties dealing with tLe same subject matter , to which the Senate
has given approval.

- 61 his "'Prcem(lnt,

{~ .

~

:'re3idcnt, estubHshed

hc'.l the preccc"ent is rcen.:orced.

Thi~·teen

years

precedent .
l<.~ter ,

Ste"Ce i)ep::Lrt:nent negotiated a s.:milar ac:;recr.1er.t with ti.e
~e"'ten .

Note no·.r

in 191.6, U:e
Kincdo~

o!'

The terms of the -c1.-.•o agrec:::-.ents we.re prc.ctically identical eJ·cep

for tHo Or.J.;ssion:::: .

The

a~ree;r.ent

llith Yemen no longer carried the phrs.. e

indicating that it was to remain in effect only ,
entry in force of a definitive treaty of
Also o:n: tted \o'as the p:hrase , I quo• e :

co•~r =-~

I quote:

11

1llltiJ th€

ca ru1d navigation . 11

"Sl.o··ld l.he governr.:cnt of tl'e

United States of America be pre·.;ented by future action of its legislature
from carryinc out the terms of these stipulations the

oblig~tions

thereof

shall thereupon lapse . 11

13 years , to !.ave

In short, the State Department appears , in

reached the conclt.sion that the poHer to na(e trea+ies of frier.dsl .ip,
co::nmerce and r."7igation had beco:ne , at least in some cases , "' unique
po'l-ler of the E:; ecutive Br anc!1, that the consent of the Senate

\-IUS

no

lonGer necessary , at lec.st in sone of these agreements .
One'year Jater , in 1947, a third acreet'lent of friendship , com:..nerce
~d

navication uas nego+.iated 'lith tl:e Kinc;do!n of l'ep'll.

the t6Kr of this abreement in its Bulletin ,

~he

In printin"

State Department

apparently still had a b·lin£:1.:! of nervousness about the procedvre it ·.tn.s
followine .

It was constrained to point to b..ro precedents.

wer e the precedents?

The

.n t.i. vernon

t<..·ree~.r 1

Yemen , Saudi-Arabia and . 1epal.

and

That

Sa•.di -Ar:.bi~l.

':'hese ere small, farauay lands.

Few of us cotJ.c locate them quickly on a '1ap .
direct concern with what transpires in them.

Still fewer ho.ve any
Yet. ,

tl~e giT~f!nt::;

-7which h"'ve been net;oti'lted with theL constitt.te a series of prece..:ents
\-lhich ic of vital i:nportance to ot:r constitutional division of po..,Jers.
"one

t"lem has ever been replaced by a regtlar tJ · a.+y , yet all of

o~

them cover subject matter 'Hhich traditionally has been hal"ldlec by
trea7.y.
Twenty- one years have elapsed since the first of these three agreements \-las negotiated.

\-!as the fail\!l'e to

rc~l u;e

the egree!.1ents by

permanent treaty an oversirht or a consciot•s e'CTlansion of the uniqte
po'l-!ers of the Execiltive at t'.e expense of the Senate?
a stra\.,r man or a very real c1.se of usurpation of power?

I3 this example
1rill the

President now se::::d thece three .1greements or t'-leir perr.anent replace~ents

is

t~e

to the Senate for advice or consent or after years and decaees
need still for temporary

!~0\-1

is the Senate to deal with the disc..ppearance of

in this fashion?
cripplin~

relations?
cure .

agree~ents?
i~s preroga~

'ves

By abdication to the House or to the 41 states or by

the capactty of the President in
In each ccse , the remedy

wo~d

t:~e

field of foreicn

be far worse ttan the

The 'Ulsuer for the Senr1te is to deal uith the real area of

d'U'lg,:.r and that area a l one., J.'he ansHer is to take only those p:recautions Hhich are necessary to prevent a burca'lcratic abuse of
extra- constitutional cle'Tice , the executive acreement .

th~.s

